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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Craig Allen Hunter entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of felony 
driving under the influence, preserving his right to challenge the district court's order 
denying his Motion to Suppress. Mr. Hunter asserts that the district court erred when it 
denied his Motion to Suppress because Corporal Pelkey did not have reasonable 
suspicion to detain him. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
While driving in Caldwell, Mr. Hunter approached Cleveland Boulevard from a 
parking lot and came to a complete stop prior to turning onto Cleveland Boulevard. 
(Tr. 11/8/13, p.15, Ls.4-11.) Cleveland Boulevard is a one-way, two-lane road that goes 
east. (Tr. 11 /8/13, p.14, Ls.22-23.) Mr. Hunter pulled across the right lane, immediately 
signaled with his left blinker, and moved into the left lane. (R., p.45.) He traveled 
approximately 150 feet while signaling with his left blinker, then proceeded to turn left 
onto 26th Avenue. (R., p.45.) Thereafter, he was pulled over by Corporal Pelkey for 
failing to utilize a turn signal for five seconds, which Corporal Pelkey believed was a 
violation of Idaho Code section 49-808(2). (R., p.45.) Corporal Pelkey testified that he 
smelled the odor of alcohol coming from Mr. Hunter's car and that Mr. Hunter's eyes 
were bloodshot and glassy. (Tr. 11/8/13, p.7, Ls.3-17.) After conducting field sobriety 
tests, Corporal Pelkey arrested Mr. Hunter for driving under the influence. (Tr. 11/8/14, 
p.8, L.1 - p.11, L.15.) Mr. Hunter was ultimately charged with felony driving under the 
influence. (R., pp.18-19.) 
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Mr. Hunter filed a motion to suppress all evidence that was obtained after Officer 
Pelkey stopped him. (R., pp.32-39.) He asserted that Corporal Pelkey did not have 
reasonable suspicion to detain him because, given that Cleveland Boulevard is not a 
controlled access highway, provision of 49-808(2) that requires that a driver signal 
continuously for five seconds prior to turning did not apply to Cleveland Boulevard and, 
therefore, he did not violate any traffic laws. (R., pp.32-39.) Mr. Hunter also argued 
that the provision of section 49-808(2) that required that a driver, on roads other than 
controlled access highways, to signal for 100 feet before turning was void because it did 
not inform a citizen as to what the appropriate signaling process was if there were fewer 
than 100 feet of travel. (R., pp.34-39.) 
At the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, Corporal Pelkey testified he measured 
the distance from the center of Cleveland Boulevard at Mr. Hunter's entry point to the 
center of 26th Avenue and determined it was 156 feet. (R., p.45.) The district court 
also took judicial notice of the preliminary hearing transcript. (Tr. 2/20/14, p.2, Ls.1-8.) 
The State conceded that the five-second rule in section 49-808(2) did not apply to travel 
on Cleveland Boulevard, but argued that Mr. Hunter did not signal for 100 feet prior to 
turning and, therefore, Corporal Pelkey's detention was proper based on a violation of 
section 49-808(2). (R., pp.45-46.) The State argued, alternatively, that Mr. Hunter 
violated Idaho Code section 49-644 because he did not turn into the farthest right lane 
of Cleveland Boulevard. (R., p.38.) Finally, the State argued that Mr. Hunter also 
violated section 49-808(2) because he did not give the appropriate signal prior to 
changing lanes. (R., pp.38-39.) The district court found that Mr. Hunter signaled for 
100 feet prior to turning left onto 26th Avenue, but did not make a specific ruling that 
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Mr. Hunter did not violate section 49-808(2). (R., pp.45-48.) It also did not reach the 
State's claims that Mr. Hunter violated section 49-808(2) by not signaling before 
changing lanes, although the court did find that Mr. Hunter never established himself in 
the right lane. (R., pp.45-48.) The district court ultimately ruled that Corporal Pelkey 
had reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Hunter based on a violation of section 49-644 
because he did not turn right into the farthest right lane of Cleveland Boulevard. 
(R., pp.44-48.) 
Mr. Hunter entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of felony driving 
under the influence, preserving his right to appeal the district court's decision on his 
Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.52-63.) He timely appealed from the district court's order 
denying his Motion to Suppress. (R., p.83.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hunter's Motion to Suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hunter's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Hunter asserts that the district court erred when it denied his Motion to 
Suppress because his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Corporal Pelkey 
detained him without reasonable suspicion. He requests that the district court's order 
denying his Motion to Suppress be reversed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297 (Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals 
articulated the following standard of review for an appeal from a motion to suppress: 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely 
review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. At 
a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is 
vested in the trial court. 
Id. at 302 (citations omitted). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hunter's Motion To Suppress 
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The purpose of this constitutional right is to "impose a standard 
of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by governmental agents and thereby 
safeguard an individual's privacy and security against arbitrary invasions." State v. 
Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002). An investigative detention is 
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constitutionally permissible based upon reasonable suspicion, derived from specific 
articulable facts, that the person stopped has committed or is about to commit a crime. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., 1, 21 (1968); State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 264 (Ct. App. 
2001 ). 
1. Corporal Pelkey Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Detain 
Mr. Hunter Because Mr. Hunter Did Not Violate Idaho Code Section 49-
808 (2) 
Idaho Code section 49-808 states in relevant part: 
(1) No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle 
right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway 
unless and until the movement can be made with reasonable safety 
nor without giving an appropriate signal. 
(2) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall 
be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access 
highways and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall 
be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all 
other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet 
traveled by the vehicle before turning. 
The State below conceded that Cleveland Boulevard is not a controlled access 
highway. (R., p.46.) Therefore, in order to comply with section 49-808(2), Mr. Hunter 
was only required to signal for 100 feet prior to turning left onto 26th Avenue. The 
district court found that, after establishing himself in the left lane, Mr. Hunter traveled 
approximately 150 feet while signaling a left turn. (R., p.45.) As such, Mr. Hunter 
complied with 49-808(2) and, therefore, Corporal Pelkey did not have reasonable 
suspicion to detain Mr. Hunter based on a violation of section 49-808(2). 
The State argued, alternatively, that Mr. Hunter also violated section 49-808(2) 
because he did not signal for 100 feet prior to changing lanes from the right lane to the 
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left lane. (R., pp.38-39.) This position is not supported by the facts ultimately found by 
the district court. The district court found, and Mr. Hunter concedes on appeal, that he 
did not turn into the right lane and establish himself there. (R., p.45.) Since he was 
never in the right lane, he was not required to signal a move from the right lane to the 
left lane. Therefore, a detention cannot be justified based on a violation of this section. 
2. Corporal Pelkey Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Detain 
Mr. Hunter Because Mr. Hunter Did Not Violate Idaho Code Section 49-
644 
Idaho Code section 49-644 states, in relevant part, that "[B]oth the approach for a 
right-hand turn and the right turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand 
curb or edge of the roadway." Mr. Hunter agrees that, as a general rule, I.C. § 49-644 
requires that a person turn right into the farthest right lane prior to changing lanes into 
the adjacent lane. See In Re Beyer, 155 Idaho 40, 44-45 (Ct. App. 2013). However, 
the plain language of the statute provides an exception to the general rule in that a 
person is not required to make a right turn into the farthest right line if it is not 
practicable. I.C. § 49-644. In a recent opinion regarding the interpretation of Idaho 
Code section 49-637(1) (lanes of travel), the Idaho Court of Appeals recently defined 
the word "practicable": "In our view, however, the term 'practicable' is unambiguous. It 
is defined as 'able to be done or put into practice successfully,' NEW OXFORD AMERICAN 
DICTIONARY 1338 (2001 ), and as 'feasible in the circumstances,' BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1172 (6th ed. 1990)." State V. Neal, No. 42534, 2014 WL 5151426, at *5 
(Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2014) (review granted). 
The district court found that Mr. Hunter violated section 49-644 because he did 
not turn into the right lane of Cleveland Boulevard, but instead drove across it and into 
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the left lane of Cleveland Boulevard. (R., pp.44-48.) Mr. Hunter concedes that he did 
not establish himself in the right lane before proceeding to the left lane and signaling his 
turn onto 26th Avenue. However, given the circumstances, Mr. Hunter maintains that 
he was in compliance with section 49-644 because it was not practicable for him to turn 
into the right lane, since doing so would prevent him from complying with 49-808(2), 
which required him to signal for 100 feet prior to turning onto 26th Avenue. Unlike 
section 49-644, section 49-808 does not provide an exception for practicability. As 
such, Mr. Hunter was required to be in the left lane for 100 feet so that he could signal 
his turn onto 26th Avenue. See I.C. § 49-808(2). Given the distance, the only way he 
could comply with section 49-808(2) was to cross the right lane and proceed into the left 
lane. (See Motion to Suppress, Defense Exhibits A-O.) Therefore, it was not feasible 
under the circumstances, and therefore not practicable, for Mr. Hunter to comply with 
section 49-644. 
The State argued below that Mr. Hunter could have complied with both sections 
49-644 and 49-808(2) if he had turned into the right lane, signaled,1 moved to the left 
hand lane, and then signaled for another 100 feet in the left lane before he reached 26th 
1 The State argued below that Mr. Hunter would only have to signal "appropriately," 
rather than for 100 feet, prior to changing lanes from the right lane to the left lane, but 
he would then have to signal for 100 feet after reaching the left lane in order to turn onto 
26th Avenue. (Tr. 2/20/14, p.27, L.4 - p.28, L.5.) The State based its internally 
inconsistent position on the Court of Appeal's opinion in Burton v. Idaho Dep't of 
Transportation, 149 Idaho 746, 749-50 (Ct. App. 2010). In this case, the Court of 
Appeals held that section 49-808 was vague as it applied to a situation where two lanes 
blended into one with neither lane ending or continuing and, therefore, a person does 
not violate the statute by not signaling in that instance. Id. Mr. Hunter's case does not 
involve merging lanes. The State presented neither a coherent argument nor authority 
for why Mr. Hunter would have to signal for 100 feet once he reached the left lane, but 
would not have had to signal 100 feet prior to moving from the left lane to the right lane. 
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Avenue. The State's position is indefensible because it is impossible, and, therefore, 
clearly impracticable. Corporal Pelkey measured the distance from the center of 
Cleveland Boulevard at Mr. Hunter's entry point to the center of 26th Avenue and 
determined it was 156 feet. (R., p.45.) Of course, a person who is traveling in the left 
lane on Cleveland Boulevard could drive 56 feet past Mr. Hunter's entry point and still 
signal for 100 feet prior to turning left on 26th Avenue. However, a person who is 
entering Cleveland Boulevard from Mr. Hunter's entry point would not be able to comply 
with both sections 49-644 and 49-808(2). Per section 49-644, a person would have to 
make his turn onto Cleveland Boulevard into the right lane. Then, in order to turn left 
onto 26th Avenue, he would have to be in the left lane. Thus, once he established 
himself in the right lane, he would have to signal for 100 feet before he could change 
lanes into the left lane, per section 49-808(2). Then, once he was established in the left 
lane, he would have to signal for another 100 feet before making a left turn onto 26th 
Avenue, per section 49-808(2). This is simply not possible given the available distance 
of 156 feet. 
The district court based its opinion that Mr. Hunter violated section 49-644 on the 
Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in In Re: Beyer, supra, 155 Idaho at 44-45. However, 
In Re: Beyer is not applicable here. The defendant in In Re: Beyer argued that section 
49-644 did not require that a person make a right turn into the farthest right lane, and 
that his behavior did not violate the statute because it fell within the broad range of 
normal driving behavior. Id. The Court of Appeals held that the statute is unambiguous 
and that failing to do what the statute demands cannot be considered normal driving 
behavior. Id. Mr. Hunter neither argues that section 49-644 is ambiguous nor that 
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failure to comply with the statute is normal driving behavior. Rather, he asserts that he 
acted in accordance with the statute because, per the plain language of the statute, 
compliance is only required when it is practicable. 
Mr. Hunter made the safest turn possible under the circumstances. He came to 
a complete stop at Cleveland Boulevard. (Tr. 11/8/13, p.15, Ls.4-11.) He pulled onto 
Cleveland Boulevard, immediately turned on his left blinker, and merged into the left 
lane, then continued to signal for approximately 150 feet. (R., p.45.) Turning into the 
right lane and establishing himself there was not practicable under the circumstances 
and would have made it impossible for Mr. Hunter to comply with section 49-808(2). 
Therefore, Mr. Hunter did not violate I.C. § 49-644, and his detention cannot be justified 
on that basis. 
D. All Evidence Collected Following The Police's Illegal Detention Of Mr. Hunter 
Should Be Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of The Illegal Governmental Activity 
The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate only 
to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249 (1990). The test is 
"whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant 
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun, supra, 371 
U.S. at 488. Suppression is required if "the evidence sought to be suppressed would 
not have come to light but for the government's unconstitutional conduct." State v. 
Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005). 
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Corporal Pelkey did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Hunter. Had 
Corporal Pelkey not illegally detained Mr. Hunter, he would not have investigated 
Mr. Hunter for driving under the influence. The State failed to meet its burden of 
showing that the evidence is untainted; therefore, the evidence must be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hunter respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment and 
commitment, reverse the district court's order denying his Motion to Suppress, and 
remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 30th day of January, 2015. 
KJMBERL Y E. SMITH 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of January, 2015, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy 
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
CRAIG ALLEN HUNTER 
532 FAIRHAVEN ROAD 
MIDDLETON ID 83644 
THOMAS J RYAN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
ALEXANDER BRIGGS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court,· . 
''~~ '"-,""," 
'-._ . ,.----·--·-- ·- c:c_.>···· "'\ ... 
EVAN A. SMITH 
¾. 
Administrative Assistant 
KES/eas 
12 
